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THE ART OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
William M. Landes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his essay “How I Work,” Paul Krugman points out that the
increasing formalism of modern economics leads most graduate stu-
dents in economics today to acquire the necessary mathematical
skills before they enter graduate school.1 I strongly suspect the con-
verse holds as well: the student who lacks a technical background
will be deterred from choosing a career in economics. This was not
always the case. Like Krugman, I came to economics from a liberal
arts background, picking up technical skills as needed both during
and after graduate school. My journey, however, was more circuitous
and unplanned than Krugman’s. That I ended up a professor of
economics and law is the outcome of an unlikely chain of events.
I started out as an art major at the High School of Music & Art
in New York City. Although art majors also were required to take
the standard fare of academic courses, it was not a strenuous aca-
demic program, and it was possible to do reasonably well without
much effort. The emphasis was clearly on the arts, and many gradu-
ates went on to specialized art and music colleges in the New York
area. I ruled that out since I was only an average art student. I also
experimented with architecture in high school. But here I fared no
better and decided not to pursue it further, in part, because my clos-
est friend had far more talent than I.2
When I entered Columbia College at seventeen I was not well
prepared for its demanding academic program (which remains
                                                                                                               
* Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Elisabeth Landes, Martha Nuss-
baum, and Richard Posner for very helpful comments. As the reader will see
the term “art” in the title bears on the subject of the essay in several ways. The
essay will appear in a forthcoming volume of the American Economicst enti-
tled “Passion and Craft, How Economissts Work.”
1 Paul Krugman, How I Work, 37 American Economist 25 (1993).
2 That friend, Charles Gwathmey, went on to become one of the leading
architects in the United States today.
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largely intact to this day). I had a good background in the arts but
undeveloped study habits. Playing tennis and piano, frequenting jazz
clubs and just hanging around Greenwich Village with my high
school friends held my interest more than studying western civiliza-
tion and humanities. But in one respect Music and Art taught me a
valuable lesson. It impressed upon me the importance of being crea-
tive and imaginative in one’s work. I have carried that lesson with
me throughout my academic career. I strive to be imaginative both
in my choice of topics and my approach to them. Rarely have I
come up with a topic by sifting through the economics literature or
scouring footnotes hoping to find loose ends to tidy up. I have often
stumbled upon a good topic while preparing my classes, participating
in seminars and workshops, auditing law school classes, talking to
colleagues or just reading the newspaper. The trick is to recognize
what one has stumbled upon, or as Robertson Davies writes in his
latest novel: “to see what is right in front of one’s nose; that is the
task....”3
II. EARLY TRAINING AS AN ECONOMIST
I took my first economics course in my junior year at college.
Two things still stand out in my mind about that course. One was
that little effort was made to show that microeconomics could illu-
minate real world problems. I and my classmates came away from
the course believing that the assumptions of microeconomics were
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ius to pay heed to them.” See David Wiggins, “Heraclitus’ Conceptions of
Flux, Fire and Material Persistence” at p. 32 in Language and Logos: Studies
in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. Owen, ed. M. Schofield
and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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so unrealistic that economics couldn’t have any bearing on real world
problems. The other was the professor’s condemnation of advertis-
ing as a monstrous social waste, a view shared by most of the
economics profession at that time. By default, I became an eco-
nomics major in my senior year at Columbia and took courses in
public finance and money and banking, and a seminar for econom-
ics majors. After graduation I went to work on Wall Street at a
brokerage firm producing colorful charts (my art background helped)
tracking the movements in earnings per share, net working capital,
etc. of different companies in the hope that I or one of the senior
members of the research department could detect likely trends in
stock prices. I soon realized that school was more fun and challeng-
ing than work, so after four months on Wall Street I returned to
Columbia on a part-time basis. My intention was to get a master’s
degree in economics and ultimately work for some government
agency. Becoming an economics professor or even getting a Ph.D.
was not on my radar screen.
Unlike more selective graduate schools, Columbia had pretty
much an open door policy, admitting large numbers of students and
letting Darwinian survival principles operate. There were always a
few exceptional students at Columbia who went on to get their
doctorates in four or five years but most didn’t survive. They either
got a master’s degree or lost interest after a year or two and dropped
out. (At the other extreme, Columbia was also home to a number of
professional students who had been around for ten or fifteen years
working on a thesis they were unlikely ever to finish.) After my first
year of graduate school, in which I continued to work half-time on
Wall Street, I realized I had a talent for economics and asked to be
admitted to the doctoral program. The chairman of the department
looked over my grades and pronounced that “my prognosis was
good” and so I became a full time doctoral student.
Success in graduate school requires brains, sustained effort and
hard work. Exceptional success at Columbia required a little luck as
well. Luck to be plucked from the mass of students by a great
economist and placed under his wing. I was lucky.
In the spring semester of my second year at graduate school, I
audited Gary Becker’s course on human capital, which covered his
still unpublished manuscript on that subject. Since Becker had been
on leave at the National Bureau of Economic Research during my
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first year, I had not taken his “price theory” course or what is now
more commonly termed microeconomics. In class, Becker called on
me regularly (sometimes I thought “ruthlessly” for I was only an
auditor) and referred to me as “an eager beaver.” If I didn’t come up
with the answer at first, Becker would tease it out of me. Having
been a member of a law school faculty for over twenty years, I am
still struck by the difference between Becker’s teaching style (unusual
even in economics departments) and that of the typical law school
professor. Like law classes, Becker called on students who did not
volunteer. But Becker would work with the student for a few min-
utes until (hopefully) he came up with the right answer. In contrast,
the law school professor practicing the Socratic method calls on
different students in rapid succession, playing one off against an-
other (“Ms. Y do you agree with Mr. X’s answer). To push the
students to think more clearly, the professor will often vary the hy-
pothetical until the reasoning behind the earlier answer collapses. A
premium is placed on verbal agility and thinking quickly on one’s
feet. A series of questions may end without a definite answer and
the teacher moves on to the next case. Indeed, the Socratic method
impresses on the student that there is no right or easy answers in
law. Yet the fact that the method survives (but in a somewhat gen-
tler form today) is a tribute to its value in training students to
become practicing lawyers.
Auditing Becker’s course in human capital, marked the begin-
ning of my training as a real economist. To be sure, I had already
been in graduate school for over a year. Yet, for the first time, I be-
gan to appreciate that economics was more than just a set of formal
tools but a way of thinking about interesting real world problems. I
began to understand the advantages of simplifying and descriptively
unrealistic assumptions, and how a person with imagination could
develop a simple model to illuminate a real world problem. Such
models provided an approach to thinking systematically about public
policy and law. Instead of saying policy X was good or fair, one
could use economic principles to spell out the consequences of that
policy.
During my third year at graduate school, I completed my course
requirements, audited Becker’s price theory course, and passed my
comprehensive oral examinations. For three or four months before
the oral exams I was part of a small group of students (we called
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ourselves “Becker Bombers”) who met regularly to review questions
from Becker’s prior exams and problems from Milton Friedman’s
soft cover textbook.4 Working through this material made it clear to
me the difference between knowing economics and thinking like an
economist. The former comes from mastering the language and
formal principles of economics that are found in graduate textbooks
and articles in professional journals. The latter from applying these
tools with varying degrees of sophistication to solving problems. The
particular problem might be a conventional economic one (e.g., will
a price ceiling on lumber lower the price of new construction) or a
problem not ordinarily viewed as an economic one (e.g., do laws
protecting privacy lead to more unconventional behavior). Any
problem involving competing goals and choices constrained by lim-
ited resources and available opportunities is fair game for economics.
The problem need not involve explicit markets or observable prices
for one can derive shadow prices that function like market prices.
Frequently, simple economic concepts applied in an imaginative way
yield subtle insights. All this may sound commonplace today but
thirty years ago it was not. It is a tribute to Gary Becker’s pioneering
efforts that we now take for granted that the domain of economics
is not confined to explicit markets but is a “way of looking at life.”5
My next stroke of good luck was quickly settling on a disserta-
tion topic. Becker proposed that I study whether state fair
employment laws improved the economic position of nonwhites in
the United States.6 I eagerly agreed both because I wanted to work
with Becker and the topic was intrinsically interesting. To get me
started, Becker gave me a copy of an unpublished paper by George
Stigler and Claire Friedland which used regression analysis to esti-
mate the effects of state utility regulation.7 At that time, it was
                                                                                                               
4 The textbook, “Price Theory: A Provisional Textbook” was based on
Friedman’s graduate course at Chicago, and a number of problems in that book
had been suggested by Aaron Director, an economics professor at the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School.
5 See Becker’s Nobel Lecture entitled “The Economic Way of Looking at
Life.”
6In 1963 (when I started my dissertation) thirteen states had passed fair
employment legislation. The major federal civil rights legislation was not en-
acted until 1964.
7George Stigler and Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
6 CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS
highly novel for an economist to employ multiple regression analysis
to estimate empirically the actual effects of a law or regulation. The
paper by Stigler and Friedland was one of the first. Before under-
taking the empirical analysis, I set out to develop a model to explain
the likely effects of fair employment laws. Here I added sanctions
against firms that discriminated against nonwhites to Becker’s the-
ory of discrimination. I assumed that an employer violating a fair
employment law faced a probability rather than a certainty of being
caught and a sanction if caught. The greater that probability and the
greater that sanction, the greater the cost of discriminating and the
more likely the employer would increase its demand for nonwhite
relative to white workers. Thus, I had a thesis that not only lent it-
self to imaginative modeling (by using the expected utility model to
analyze law enforcement) but was capable of answering empirically
an important public policy question.
Developing a model was the easy part compared to carrying out
the empirical analysis. Acquiring empirical skills requires a good deal
of “learning by doing.” Graduate school had not prepared me for the
many months I would have to spend meticulously gathering data
state-by-state from census volumes, calculating state averages by race
for earnings, years of schooling and other variables, fitting Pareto
distributions to open ended Census intervals, and collecting data
from state fair employment commissions on the number of prosecu-
tions, enforcement expenditures, sanctions and so forth. I was my
own research assistant and I carried out most of these calculations
on a mechanical calculator that frequently jammed. Fortunately,
computers make it possible today to avoid this kind of tedious work
although I don’t have the impression that this has increased the fre-
quency of empirical dissertations in economics.
III. GETTING STARTED IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
In its broadest sense, “law and economics” is coextensive with a
large part of the field of industrial organization. Both cover, among
other things, the study of the legal regulation of markets including
economic analysis of the business practices described in antitrust
cases. These cases provide a rich source of material on such practices
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as tie-in sales, exclusive dealing, vertical restrictions and information
exchanges among competitors. Both fields also include research on
the theoretical and empirical consequences of different types of gov-
ernment regulations and laws. Thus, the most recent issue of the
Journal of Law & Economics (a leading journal in both industrial
organization and law and economics) includes articles by economists
on the anticompetitive effects of most-favored-nation clauses, the
effects on stock prices of regulatory drug recalls, the performance of
the airline industry under deregulation, and the impact of collective
bargaining legislation on labor disputes in the public sector. For my
purposes, however, I want to define law and economics more nar-
rowly. I want to limit it to what is called the “new” law and
economics, a field which essentially began with Ronald Coase’s arti-
cle on social cost over thirty years ago8 and where most work has
been carried on in law schools rather than economics departments.
The “new” law and economics applies the tools of economics to
the legal system itself. It uses economics to explain and illuminate
legal doctrines in all fields of law including the common law fields
of torts, contracts and property, intellectual property, corporate law,
bankruptcy law, criminal law and the legal process itself (e.g., the
effects of fee shifting statutes, discovery rules and legal precedent on
litigation). The “new” law and economics is not limited to areas of
law that only impact explicit markets. It is a theory of both the legal
rules themselves and their consequences for behavior. The former is
the more controversial of the two. It treats legal rules and doctrines
as “data” in order to test the hypothesis that the law is best explained
as efforts by judges, often implicitly, to decide case as if they are try-
ing to promote economic efficiency.
I got started in the “new” law and economics by chance rather
than by any well thought out plan to work in this area.9 Shortly af-
ter finishing my thesis on the effects of fair employment laws (the
“old” law and economics) I came across a newspaper article on plea
bargaining in criminal cases. The article pointed out that only a
small fraction (probably less than five percent) of criminal defen-
dants actually went to trial. The rest pleaded guilty, often to
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9 Hereafter I use the phrase “law and economics” also to denote the “new”
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substantially reduced charges. Investigating a little further I learned
similarly that only a small fraction of civil cases ended up in trial.
Most were settled out-of-court before trial. Not only did these issues
seem like a natural subject for economic analysis (an example of
“seeing what is right in front of one’s nose”) but no one had previ-
ously examined it from the standpoint of economics—maybe
because economists believed that people were more likely to behave
emotionally than rationally in a litigation setting.
But as Becker’s former student, I had no trouble assuming that
parties behaved rationally in non-market settings. The ultimate test
was whether rational behavior was a useful assumption not whether
it was descriptively realistic. I reasoned (using Coase’s theorem) that
the prosecutor and defendant would reach a plea bargain on a sen-
tence if both could be made better off compared to risking an
uncertain trial outcome. Similarly, parties would prefer to settle a
civil lawsuit out-of-court provided one could find a settlement that
made both better off than their expected trial outcomes. Assuming
that trials were more costly than plea bargains or settlements, I
showed that if the parties agreed on the probabilities of winning and
losing at trial, they would always settle (unless they had strong pref-
erences for risk) because each party’s utility from a settlement would
be greater than his expected utility from a trial. Further, trials would
be more likely to occur when the parties were mutually optimistic
(i.e., each party believed he had a greater probability of winning a
trial than his opponent believed), were risk preferrers, where the cost
of trials were low relative to the cost of reaching a settlement, and
where the stakes in litigation were greater (for that magnified the
difference in expected outcomes for mutually optimistic parties). My
paper also has implications for law enforcement for I showed that
criminals as a class could be made worse off by plea bargains even
though any particular offender was made better off by avoiding a
trial (a true prisoner’s dilemma) because settlements freed resources
that enabled the prosecutor to pursue more criminals.
I presented a preliminary version of this paper10 in 1967 to the
labor workshop at the University of Chicago. At the time I was an
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assistant professor in the economics department at Chicago. My talk
was not greeted with much enthusiasm. After, one of my senior
colleagues in the department took me aside for some friendly advice.
He said I was making a career mistake by doing research on prob-
lems like the courts that were only of marginal interest to other
economists. Professional success, he emphasized, required working
on problems of the latest interest to other economists. I asked him
how one knew what was of the “latest interest.” He replied that one
could gauge interest by seeing what problems other economists were
currently working on. In short, see what your colleagues are work-
ing on and try to take it a step further. I decided to ask Gary Becker
what he thought (though I suspect I already knew what he would
say). Becker had just finished his paper on the economics of crime,
and one of Becker’s students, Isaac Ehrlich, was completing a thesis
at Columbia on the deterrent effects of conviction rates and sanc-
tions on crime. Becker disagreed with my Chicago colleague. His
advice was simple: law enforcement and litigation are interesting
and important social issues that can be illuminated by economics;
don’t worry so much about whether your work is part of the latest
fad in economics; and ultimately good work will be recognized.
Fortunately, I listened to Gary Becker.
In 1968 I moved from Chicago to New York City to accept a
fellowship at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a year
later I joined the NBER’s research staff. At that time, members of
the NBER’s staff resided almost entirely in New York City. Al-
though I also had academic appointments in the economics
departments at Columbia and later at the Graduate Center of the
City University, my intellectual life centered on the NBER. The
NBER offered me the freedom to choose projects interesting to me
and to avoid the distractions associated with student turmoil at Co-
lumbia during this period. The Bureau had a professional and no-
                                                                                                               
the U.S. was eventually published in the Journal of Law & Economics in
1971. That paper plus papers by Richard Posner, Jack Gould and Steven Shav-
ell have stimulated a voluminous law and economics literature on the resolution
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Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolu-
tion, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067 (1989) discuss more than 100 such articles. I
suspect that the number of articles has at least doubled since the year of the
survey article.
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nonsense attitude toward research—projects were undertaken with
the expectation that they would be completed, rough deadlines were
imposed, progress reports were required, and research directors took a
strong interest in the work under their direction. But there was also
the give-and-take and informality of a university that I cherished.
The Bureau was an ideal place for conducting serious empirical
rsearch.
When I joined the NBER it was best known for its empirical
research in traditional economic subjects such as business cycles and
national income accounting but it was beginning to branch out into
other areas of economics. For example, Becker and Jacob Mincer ran
projects on the economics of education and human capital, and
Victor Fuchs directed a program in health economics. The Bureau
formally established a program in law and economics in 1971 which
was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The
program included Becker, myself, Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner
(then professor at the University of Chicago Law School and now
chief judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit).
Adding Posner filled a critical hole in the program. In order to apply
economics to areas of law other than crime and the courts we
needed some expertise in law. Posner seemed ideal. He had a strong
interest in economics, had already published several widely regarded
papers in antitrust, and was starting to apply economics to torts and
judicial administration.
It should be mentioned that the early applications of economics
to law at the NBER (pre-Posner) and elsewhere required almost no
knowledge of law. This was true of Becker’s paper on crime, Ehr-
lich’s pioneering studies of deterrence and law enforcement, and my
own work on the courts, plea bargaining and the bail system. That
this should be so is not surprising. We were economists applying the
theoretical and empirical tools of economics to the systematic study
of enforcement.11 To be sure, we had to develop some basic under-
standing about the relevant legal terms and institutions under
investigation, but that requires far less knowledge of law than be-
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coming familiar and comfortable with legal rules and doctrines in
order to analyze them from an economic standpoint.
IV. AN ECONOMIST ON A LAW SCHOOL FACULTY
Although the Bureau provided a superb research environment, it
could not match the intellectual excitement of the University of
Chicago. Chicago was home to the economists I most ad-
mired—Becker, Coase, Friedman and Stigler. Plus it offered me the
opportunity to work more closely with Posner. So in 1973 I eagerly
accepted a tenured appointment at the University of Chicago Law
School. The Law School had a long tradition of having an econo-
mist on its faculty starting with Henry Simons, Aaron Director and
Ronald Coase. When I arrived Coase was still an active member of
the faculty but taught only an occasional course. Still my appoint-
ment was somewhat unusual. I was genuinely interested in
explaining legal rules and doctrines from an economic perspective.
Coase was not. He believed that knowledge of law and legal institu-
tions was valuable because it helped one understand how explicit
markets truly worked. But Coase had little interest in showing, for
example, that the various legal doctrines governing liability for acci-
dents or contract damages had an implicit economic logic. It is one
of the ironies of law and economics that the person whose pioneer-
ing work (cited by the Nobel committee) provided the foundation
for the subject has been less than enthusiastic about its development.
Coase believed that much of law and economics was outside the
domain of economics and that, in any event, lawyers rather than
economists were better suited for the enterprise. Most law professors
went even further. They believed that lawyers would also fail in ex-
plaining law from an economic perspective.
At the few law schools with an economist on their faculty in the
1970s (as opposed to a law professor who happened to have a gradu-
ate degree in economics), the economist was hired to teach price
theory, co-teach with a law professor a course on business regulation
such as antitrust and serve as a resource to the few law professors
who thought economics might have something to contribute to
their particular area of law. The economist did not mess with law
nor was he expected to do so. And even when he stuck to econom-
ics, the results could be unsettling. One only has to recall the often-
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told story of the antitrust course at Chicago in the 1950s co-taught
by Professors Edward Levi, later Attorney General of the United
States, and Aaron Director. During the first four classes of each
week, Levi would carefully go over the cases and struggle to make
sense of the judge’s economic reasoning. On the fifth day, Director
would explain why everything that went on during the previous four
classes was wrong.
A. Research Interests
Twenty years ago there were two options open to an economist
who wanted to contribute to the “new” law and economics. He
could collaborate with a law professor interested in economics or
immerse himself in law and, given enough time and effort, become
sufficiently comfortable with legal materials to work on his own.
(Today there is a third way. By studying the substantial law and
economics literature, one may be able to find promising but often
technical problems to work on.) I chose to do both. I collaborated
with Posner and I immersed myself in the study of law. Not that I
wanted to be a lawyer but I wanted to know enough about different
areas of law to see where economics would be most useful. Unlike
most other economists, I actually enjoyed reading law cases. I read
them with an economist’s eye, however. I looked for and often
found an implicit economic logic in the outcome of a case. And if I
didn’t quite get the law right or misinterpreted what the judge said,
neither of which was unusual, I always had Posner or one of my
other colleagues at the law school to straighten me out.
My first paper with Posner started out as a theoretical comment
on Becker’s and Stigler’s paper on private enforcement. We showed
that private enforcement could lead to over enforcement relative to
(optimal) public enforcement because a higher fine would lead pri-
vate enforcers to step up rather than reduce their enforcement
activity.12 But the paper quickly developed into a more ambitious
project. We tested the predictions of the analysis against real world
observations. We explained why there is a greater reliance on private
enforcement in contract, torts and other “private law” areas com-
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volved a low probability of apprehension and conviction and a high fine which
produced the same level of deterrence at lower costs.
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pared to criminal law; why victims rather than others have the ex-
clusive rights to sue and redress violations; why the budget of public
enforcement agencies tend to be small relative to what private profit
maximizing enforcers would spend; and why public enforcers nullify
particular laws by declining to prosecute whereas private enforcers
would not. We also applied the model to blackmail and bribery as
forms of enforcement and the legal rules governing rewards for lost
or stolen property—also a method of compensating private enforc-
ers.
In an important sense the paper on private enforcement repre-
sented a sharp departure from my earlier work. It systematically
applied economics to a large number of legal rules and showed how
these rules promoted economic efficiency. Of course, this was
mainly due to Posner for I lacked the necessary knowledge of law.
But I was determined to remedy this deficiency by auditing law
courses—particularly, basic first year courses such as civil procedure,
contracts and torts—and by jointly teaching law courses and semi-
nars with law professors.
Over the next twenty years, Posner and I co-authored more
than 25 articles and a book on tort law. Our work was truly a joint
effort and continues to this day. I have had greater responsibility for
the economic modeling and Posner for the law but each of us con-
tributed substantially to both the economics and the law. True,
there were substantial gains from trade because we each brought
different skills to the enterprise but the final product greatly ex-
ceeded the sum of the individual parts. We each raised the marginal
product of the other. Looking over the papers, it would be mislead-
ing to say “Posner did this” or “I did that” for the ideas, choice of
topics, approaches to them and execution were always joint efforts.
The topics we collaborated on covered a broad range of legal subjects
including legal precedent, the resolution of legal disputes, laws gov-
erning rescue such as salvage in admiralty law, antitrust, torts, the
role of an independent judiciary, trade secrets, trademarks and copy-
right. Our best known work, the book The Economic Structure of
Tort Law, showed how a relatively simple economic model of
wealth maximization could explain and organize what at first ap-
peared an incomprehensible array of unrelated rules and doctrines
governing tort liability. We covered all the important areas of torts
from simple problems such as the choice between negligence and
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strict liability rules for ordinary accidents, to more complicated ques-
tions involving defenses to liability, causation, joint torts (two or
more injurers), catastrophic injuries (many victims), and intentional
torts.
Although I have also worked on a number of projects on my
own, including papers on litigation and copyright law, I continue to
do collaborative work both with Posner and more recently with
Larry Lessig, a recently appointed law professor at Chicago.13 I am
surprised that collaboration between lawyers and economists is not
more common because the gains from trade seem so substantial.
Aside from Posner and myself, the only other long term collabora-
tion involves Charles Goetz, an economist, and Robert Scott, a law
professor and now Dean, of the University of Virginia Law
School.14 On the other hand, an increasing phenomenon at law
schools is the lawyer who also has a Ph.D. in economics. Most of
these are recent law school graduates. Their work is a form of col-
laboration between a lawyer and economist but involves one person.
B. The Changing Role of the Law School Economist
Over the years I have become much more comfortable with law,
and pretty much have become assimilated into the law school cul-
ture. That is also true for other economists who have full-time
positions at law schools. We spend much more time with our col-
leagues at the law school than we do with economists in the
economics department or business schools. Proximity is one reason
but there are more fundamental forces at work.
                                                                                                               
13 Lessig and I are completing a large scale project estimating empirically
the influence and reputation of federal court judges by counting citations to
their opinions. Viewing citations as “output,” we borrow from the human
capital literature, and estimate equations of citations on experience and a variety
of other variables. Not only do we rank judges but we examine factors that may
explain differences in influence among judges (e.g., race, sex, quality of law
school law school performance, prior experience, etc.).
14 As a rough measure of the benefits from collaboration, Landes and
Goetz accounted for more than 45 percent of the citations in law journals to
the articles and books of economists at the top fifteen law schools. (See Landes
and Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.
Law & Econ. 385 (1993) ).
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One is that economics departments have become less interested
in applied economics such as law and economics. Economics has
become more formal and theoretical. Research is increasingly aimed
at demonstrating technical skills and solving technical problems
rather than at analyzing social problems. Consequently, the law
school economist feels less comfortable intellectually on the other
side of the campus. Fortunately, this is less true at Chicago, and I
continue to attend economics and business school workshops with
Becker, Sam Peltzman, Sherwin Rosen and others. But Chicago is
unusual.
Another is that economists at law schools have more in com-
mon with law professors today than twenty years ago because
economics has transformed legal scholarship in torts, contracts, se-
curities, antitrust, corporations, environmental law, intellectual
property and other business related areas. There are large numbers of
law professors who consider themselves members of the law and
economics movement.15 Another indication of the growing im-
portance of economics at law schools is the appointment of
economists (but virtually no other nonlawyers) to full-time positions
at all major and many other law schools. Twenty years ago, the
economist at a law school was a peripheral figure. Today he occupies
a central position.
A related factor is the increasing importance of economics in the
teaching of law. Law schools are professional schools that view their
primary mission as educating future practitioners. For economics to
be more than of marginal importance, it must demonstrate its rele-
vance to the education of future practicing lawyers. It has done this
by making significant contributions to the practice of law. Eco-
nomics has altered antitrust; plays a significant role in securities,
pension, environmental, unfair competition and discrimination liti-
gation; and is important in valuation and damage calculations in
virtually all large scale commercial law suits. Law students are quick
to recognize the value of economics in the practice of law. Knowing
economics gives them an edge over their competitors. As a result,
law and economics courses are increasingly popular at law schools as
                                                                                                               
15 A pretty good measure of this is that lawyers comprise about 50 percent
of 400 or so members of the recently formed American Law & Economics As-
sociation.
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are our courses jointly taught by lawyers and economists in a variety
of subjects. Moreover, it is not uncommon today for an economist
to teach a law course alone, which was unheard of thirty years ago.
Consider my teaching responsibilities. Although I run the law and
economics workshop, I teach copyrights, trademarks and unfair
competition and (my favorite) art law. These are not law and eco-
nomics courses but regular law school courses. To be sure, I add a
heavy dose of economics not only because I am an economist but
because the cases explicitly discuss and recognize the importance of
economic factors and because the use of economics (by lawyers) in
private law subjects has become commonplace. Indeed, I have be-
come so assimilated into the world of academic law that I am now a
professor of law and economics not just a professor of economics
(my original title at the law school).
C. The Future
I have been struck by comments made to me on several occasions
from young scholars starting out in law and economics today. The
gist of their remarks is that “when you started out there were lots of
areas of law open to economics but you and others have taken all the
interesting problems so now there is nothing left.” There is, of
course, an element of truth to this but it is greatly exaggerated. Early
on, an economist auditing a law school course in torts or contract
was like a child in a candy store—there was an interesting topic to
be discovered in almost every class. Indeed, the difficulty was not
finding topics but deciding which ones to work on. My torts book
with Posner is a good example. While auditing Posner’s tort course,
I worked up economic notes on the cases and doctrines discussed in
class and in the casebook. Then I refined and expanded this material
in connection with a course I taught in law and economics. These
notes became the starting point for our tort book. But today eco-
nomic analysis of common law fields like torts and contracts have
been so picked over that it would be a mistake for a young scholar to
concentrate on them. The same is probably true for litigation mod-
els though I am less confident here because recent applications of
game theory to litigation has yielded some interesting new scholar-
ship.
What is left? Law and economic scholars have only recently ap-
plied the tools of game theory to understanding how legal doctrines
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may overcome strategic behavior and asymmetrical information.16
This remains a promising area for future work. Turning to particular
fields of law, one observes that constitutional law has been barely
touched by economic analysis. And family law, criminal law (as dis-
tinct from empirical studies of deterrence), legal procedure and
intellectual property have been relatively neglected compared to torts,
contracts and corporate law. These fields also remain promising for
future work. But the most neglected side of law and economics is
empirical. In most areas of law and economics there is a dearth of
empirical studies that are surely worth doing. Recently, I surveyed all
articles published in the Journal of Legal Studies (the leading “new”
law and economics journal) during the last five years, and found that
only about 20 percent had some empirical content. Contrast this
with the Journal of Political Economy where more than 60 percent
of articles published in the past year contained substantial empirical
analysis.17 This difference cannot be accounted for solely by differ-
ences in data availability. There are substantial bodies of data on the
number and disposition of criminal and civil cases at both the trial
and appellate levels, awards in civil cases, sentences in criminal cases,
earnings of lawyers, accident rates and so forth. Moreover, comput-
erized legal databases make it possible at relatively low cost to extract
significant amounts of information from cases in order to develop
data sets relevant to the problems at hand.
                                                                                                               
16 For an excellent start in this direction see Douglas Baird, Robert Gert-
ner and Randal Picker, Game Theory and the Law, Harv. Univ. Press (1994).
17 The reason there are relative few empirical articles in law and econom-
ics is an interesting question in itself. I recently addressed this issue in a
presentation on law and economics at the annual meetings of the American
Economics Association in 1994. I advanced several explanations including the
fact that the initial success of law and economics at law schools came not from
empirical studies but from the light that economics shed on legal doctrines;
that the law school culture values verbal quickness and analytical skills but not
painstaking empirical analysis; that law and economics has been centered at law
schools rather than economics departments or business schools; and that law
professors, the major contributors to law and economics, are selected for verbal
not quantitative skills. Equally puzzling is why economists on law faculties
also tend to avoid empirical analysis. But again this is related to both the re-
ward structure at law schools and the kind of economists who have been
attracted to law and economics.
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Finally, there are different approaches to research. One can work
productively and imaginatively at either the intensive or extensive
margin. The first approach is illustrated by Coase’s work on prob-
lems such as marginal cost pricing, the organization of firms, social
cost and durable goods monopolies. Before Coase, economists had
worked on these problems for many years. Yet Coase was able to say
something new and novel about these problems and ultimately to
change the way economists think about them. Becker, on the other
hand, works primarily at the extensive margin showing the relevance
of economics to a wide range of social issues usually considered be-
yond economics. These include marriage, divorce, bringing up
children, education, altruism, crime, addiction and preference for-
mation. As Becker and Coase have shown, Nobel Prizes can be won
at either margin. The fact that there now exists a substantial body of
literature in law and economics makes it simultaneously more diffi-
cult to work at the extensive margin but easier to work at the
intensive margin.
D. Consulting or Law and Economics in Action
Describing my career in law and economics would be seriously
incomplete without considering consulting or what I call “law and
economics in action.” In 1977, Posner, Andrew Rosenfield, then a
third year student at the law school, and I founded the firm Lexecon
Inc. Economics was just starting to catch on in antitrust litigation
and regulatory proceedings. We were confident that it was going to
play a bigger role in the future. At the same time, law firms and
their clients often expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of eco-
nomic consulting services they were receiving. Their main
complaint was that, in the end, they weren’t getting good value for
their money. The economic analysis and empirical studies were
costly and rarely provided much help. But part of the problem rested
with the lawyers who had so little understanding of economics that
they did not know how to deploy it effectively.
The idea behind Lexecon was a simple one. There existed a
market niche for a firm that supplied high quality economic con-
sulting services that would be relevant and helpful in litigation and
regulatory matters. We brought unique qualities to this venture.
Posner was a lawyer who knew economics, I was an economist who
knew how to explain economics to lawyers, and Rosenfield, who
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had graduate training in economics to go along with his law degree,
was willing to devote himself full time to building up Lexecon, as we
were not. Together we could figure out what economic studies
should be done, direct and supervise them efficiently, and, when
needed, bring in other academic economists who had expertise and
specialized knowledge in the areas being litigated.
Lexecon played an educational role as well. Many exceptionally
talented and experience attorneys felt at sea when it came to eco-
nomics and statistics. But they were fast and eager learners. We
explained basic economics (and even econometrics) and showed
them how they could use economics to help structure and
strengthen legal arguments. With this panoply of services we were
able to convince law firms to turn over to Lexecon the economic
side of many large cases. We had another selling point. We did not
pose an economic threat to law firms. We were not competing for
their clients because we didn’t practice law. Indeed, Lexecon became
a competitive tool in the hands of law firms because it enabled them
to offer their clients a superior product.
As they say the rest is history. Lexecon became enormously suc-
cessful and spawned many imitators. It is a source of great personal
satisfaction to me that I helped create and develop Lexecon. Today
Lexecon has about 125 full-time employees in Chicago18 (although
Posner left in 1981 when he became a judge and I have significantly
reduced my role in the past few years) including a large staff of ex-
traordinarily able economists with Ph.D.’s, and affiliations with a
number of leading academic economists including several Nobel
Prize winners.19
Economic consulting has become an increasingly attractive op-
tion for some of the brightest Ph.D.’s in economics. If offers the
prospect of considerably greater financial rewards than academics
(but not the prospect of formal tenure) and a wide range of real
world problems to work on because the role of economic evidence,
once largely limited to antitrust cases and calculating damages in
                                                                                                               
18 I might add that Lexecon’s offices were designed by Charles Gwathmey
(see footnote 2).
19 Rosenfield is now President but is also a senior lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School where he teaches antitrust, securities and
evidence.
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personal injury cases, has expanded to embrace virtually all kind of
large scale commercial litigation. Economists are routinely employed
in areas such as securities and corporate law, pension law, environ-
mental and safety regulation, and discrimination litigation. Indeed,
it would verge on legal malpractice not to use an economist in these
areas.
There is, of course, an important difference between academics
and consulting. An academic sets his own agenda. He has the luxury
to choose whatever problem catches his fancy and the pace at which
to pursue them. Not so in consulting. There, the problem is placed
before you, and you face the press of time, the tension of litigation,
long hours, and travel away from home. Moreover, millions of dol-
lars may be at stake and your role may be crucial. Not surprising, one
tends to get caught up in the excitement of litigation and relish the
satisfaction from having done a first rate job. Rewards come more
slowly, if at all, to the academic economist.
There is a common misconception about litigation among aca-
demic economists who have little or no consulting experience. They
assume that the pressures of litigation compel an economist who
testifies as an expert witness to slant his analysis, present only favor-
able results and massage the data in order to come up with the
answers the client wants. The flaw in this argument is it ignores
how litigation works. Both the data the expert relies on and his
analysis are turned over to the opposing party way before any testi-
mony in court is given. The opposition, armed with their own
economists, will check the opposing expert’s calculations, reestimate
his equations, analyze the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative
specifications, see how the results change if other variables are added,
and so forth. The combination of high stakes and the workings of
the adversary system means there is a very high probability that any
mistakes, whether intentional or inadvertent, will be unmasked.
The same holds for economic presentations before regulatory agen-
cies such as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or
the Federal Trade Commission. They have their own professional
staff of economists to analyze the expert’s work. Contrast this with
academic work. A well refereed journal will often catch theoretical
mistakes. But it is far easier to get away with sloppy and even inten-
tionally misleading empirical analyses in academic studies than in
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litigation because it is rare that other economists will take the trou-
ble to check the earlier work.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In describing his evolution as an economist, Ronald Coase
wrote: “I came to realize where I had been going only after I arrived.
The emergence of my ideas at each stage was not part of some grand
scheme.”20 That phrase captures my journey as well. I had no par-
ticular career path in mind when I started graduate school. I chose
economics rather than something else because I had taken a handful
of economics courses as an undergraduate. I got started in law and
economics by chance because I came across a newspaper article on
plea bargaining. True, I wanted to apply economics to important
social issues but law was just one of many possibilities. I worked on a
wide range of topics in law that, on looking back, evidence a com-
mon approach but not an overall scheme to remake legal
scholarship. I never thought I was part of a movement but now it is
commonplace to hear about how the “law and economics move-
ment” has transformed legal scholarship and teaching.
I was also extraordinarily fortunate to have worked with Becker
and Posner. Becker opened my eyes as a student to the power of
economics to illuminate social issues and has been a source of inspi-
ration ever since. Posner is probably the most influential legal
scholar and certainly the most prolific in this century. It is hard to
imagine that law and economics would have been anywhere near as
successful had he chosen another career.21 I also had another ex-
traordinary bit of luck. I married an economist more than twenty
five years ago who has been my best critic and the source of count-
less ideas. I met Lisa when I was an assistant professor and she was a
first year graduate student in the economics department at Chicago.
Had the current rules and policies governing sexual harassment at
                                                                                                               
20 R. H. Coase, My Evolution as an Economist (1994), unpublished ver-
sion of a lecture in the “Lives of the Laureates” series, given at Trinity
University, San Antonio, Texas on April 12, 1994.
21 It would be more accurate to say “had he not chosen economics as one of
his careers.” Posner is also a federal court of appeals judge (whose opinions are
cited more frequently than any other appellate court judge) and a significant
contributor to other fields such as law and literature and jurisprudence.
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universities and the like been in place in 1968, I would never have
dated a graduate student. Many believe the benefits (e.g., reducing
coercion by men) of sexual harassment policies exceed the transac-
tion and other costs such policies may impose on the dating and
marriage markets. In my case, however, I would have been a big
loser. But the general subject of sexual harassment is a great topic for
future work in law and economics.
This essay will appear in a forthcoming volume of The American
Economist. Readers with comments should address them to:
William M. Landes
Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics
The Law School
The University of Chicago
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
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